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I. INTRODUCTION
To paraphrase Clemenceau, human life is too important to leave to
the physicians. The public has marveled at what the medical profession
has wrought with organ transplants and the possibilities of biological re-
production. However, the physician cannot be permitted to play God, act-
ing according to his whim in determining who may live and who may die.
Institutional guidelines must be established through law. Modern medicine
gives birth to new legal problems. The law and lawyers must play a signifi-
cant role in developing techniques to protect human dignity and to assure
that medical science is indeed utilized for the benefit of human well-being
and not as an end in itself to satisfy the physician's simple curiosity or de-
sire for notoriety.
This paper will focus on organ transplants, particularly the transfer
of hearts, noting the state of technological development and the legal prob-
lems which have arisen, especially in determining when a person may be
declared to be legally dead. In this regard, the author will propose a statute
to establish standards of due process for determining the time of death.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
For centuries, surgeons had dreamed of the idea of replacing a dis-
eased or injured limb or organ. Italian surgeons during the Renaissance
occasionally succeeded in repairing a sword-slashed nose or arm with flesh
from the patient's own arm, but attempts to graft from person to person
always failed. The first widely attempted transplants were blood transfu-
sions;-from lamb to man or man to man, with some succeeding, but most
failing. The first consistently successful human monografts-=between two
individuals of the same species-occurred in 1905. These were transplants
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of the cornea, a transparent plastic covering of the eyeball which has no
blood circulation.
The surgical techniques used in organ transplants were developed by
Doctors Claude Guthrie and Alexis Carrell in 1905 in experimental animal
transplants. In 1953, these techniques were complemented by the work of
Sir Peter Brian Medawar, which revealed details of the immunity mecha-
nism involving the white blood cells which manufacture anti-bodies against
foreign invaders: The implantation of foreign tissue triggered the rejection
mechanism. Accordingly, the first successful kidney transplants in 1954 in-
volved identical twins, whose tissue had a common origin and was less for-
eign.'
The problem in transplants has been to devise a way of switching off
the rejection mechanism long enough for the body to accept the transplant
and then to restore the immunity so that the recipient will not be suscep-
tible to infection. Some progress was originally made with X-rays, anti-
cancer chemicals, and cortisone-type hormones. Complex methods have
been devised to match white blood cells in order to reduce anti-body for-
mation and, also, to make an antilymphotic serum in horses which reduces
the white cells' activities. This partial success permitted kidney trans-
plants with the recipient having a 65 percent chance of survival. 2 More
than two thousand kidney transplants have been undertaken since 1954,
with over 800 recipients surviving for more than one year. However,
transplants of the liver and pancreas have resulted in little success.8 Thirty-
five liver transplants have transpired since 1963, with only one recipient
surviving more than one year; seven spleen transplants since 1963, with
two one-year survivors; seven pancreas transplants since 1966, with no
recipient surviving one year; and eleven whole and partial lung trans-
plants since 1963, with the longest survival being only 18 days.4
Heart transplants have received the most attention. Reports of such
transplants in dogs first appeared in 1955; these were performed by Dr.
Charles Bailey.5 Ironically, 1955 was the same year in which Dr. Christian
Barnard came to the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis for post-
graduate study in surgery under Professor Owen Wangensteen, who was
launching Minnesota's Department of Surgery upon a pioneering series of
experiments in organ transplants.' Dr. Barnard's studies at the university
were financed in part by a grant from the United States Health Service.
1. The Ultimate Operation, TrmE, Dec. 15, 1967, at 64. See also Carroll, The Ethics of
Transplantation, 56 A.B.A.J. 137 (1970).
2. Kidneys Lead the Field, 93 Sci. NEWS 214 (1968). In kidney transplantation, the
time of death of the donor is less vital than in heart transplants, since the period of ischemia
(lack of blood Supply), if not too prolonged, may destroy some of the antigenic qualities
of the transplant and thus make the kidney more acceptable to the recipient. Biorck, When
Is Death?, 18 Wis. L. REV. 484, 491-92 (1968).
3. Transplant Rounds, MED. WORLD NEWS, Jan. 10, 1969, at 26.
4. Transplant Score, MED. WORLD NEWS, Sept. 27, 1968, at 27.
5. Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SAT. Ry., Feb. 3, 1968, at 53.
6. Id.
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The first heart transplant at the end of 1967 was the culmination for Dr.
Barnard of over a decade of development and study of surgical techniques.
The South African transplants were quickly followed by the transplants of
Dr. Norman E. Shumway, Jr. of Stanford University, and Dr. Adrian
Kantrowitz in Brooklyn. Transplants in the United States were later un-
dertaken by Dr. Denton Cooley and Dr. Michael DeBakey in Houston.
Within a year, 36 medical centers in 16 countries had performed heart
transplants; 7 such countries included France,' Argentina,' Brazil, 0
Canada," Great Britain,' 2 India,' s Israel, 4 and the Soviet Union.' 5 Heart
transplants have thus become a worldwide phenomenon.
The circus-like publicity given to the first heart transplants, as well as
the experimental nature of the undertaking with its attendant risks, pro-
voked skepticism among surgeons and physicians who urged a more con-
servative approach.' However, after a year of human organ transplants,
these techniques have become routine to the art of heart surgery and have
generally been accepted both in the United States and the Soviet Union.'7
Nevertheless, even the experts cannot agree as to whether organ trans-
plantation or heart surgery in general is the best method for dealing with
a defective heart.' If heart surgery, instead of transplantation, ultimately
becomes the preferred technique, the future development of the artificial
heart may eliminate the need for transplants. 9 However, in the absence of
a perfected artificial heart, the debate over the propriety of transplants
continues to rage due to the medical uncertainty surrounding the rejection
phenomenon.2 0 Moreover, some patients with heart transplants have expe-
7. Id.
8. Hess, French Perform Europe's First Heart Transplant, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1968,
at 51, col. 2.
9. Transplants, An Anniversary Review, TmSE, Dec. 6, 1968, at 59.
10. Troubled Hearts, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1968, at 60; Beating Heart Implanted,
MED. WORLD NEWS, June 21, 1968, at 20.
11. Id.
12. Id.; Perform 1st Heart Plant in Britain, Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1968, at 15, col.
5. See also HOSPITAL TRIBUNE, July 14, 1969, at 1 (describing a second transplant
which was performed in Britain in 1969).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. Id.; Israel's First Heart Transplant, ISRAEL DIGEST, Dec. 13, 1968, at 3.
15. Shabad, Heart Transplants in Soviet Union Growing in Acceptance, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1969, at 27, col. 3.
16. See note 5, supra. Smothers, Heart Transplant Doubts Rise, Chicago Daily News,
March 30, 1968, at 3, col. 3.
17. See notes 9 and 15 supra. Shifting Stands on Heart Transplants, MED. WORLD NEWS,
June 7, 1968, at 24.
18. See note 5 supra. What's Ahead, MED. WORLD NEWS, March 21, 1969, at 51; Even
the Implanters Can't Agree on Surgical Strategy, MED. WORLD NEWS, Jan. 10, 1969, at 18;
The Heart Transplant Debate, Chicago Daily News, Jan. 22, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
19. Snider, Artificial Hearts-One Up on Transplants, Chicago Daily News, April 5,
1969, at 5, col. 1; Practical Benefit of Heart Transplanting Remains Uncertain Despite
Headlines, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1968, at 21.
20. Id. See also Problems Technical Not Ethical, 93 Sc. NEws 216 (1968).
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rienced psychoses and personality changes2 1 from the introduction of a
new organ which conceivably effects the entire homeostatic make-up of
the body.
The substance used in preventing organ rejection is anti-lymphocite
globulin-ALG-which interferes with the cells (lymphocytes) that seem
to produce rejection. Unfortunately, ALG produces allergic reactions in
some patients, and particular problems have arisen among patients whose
transplant organs come from persons without matching tissue, particularly
in kidney transplants where traces of cancer have appeared. An insidious
rejection may occur within months or weeks after receiving therapy.2
Clearly, there are risks involved in heart transplants. Nevertheless,
the surgeons who have undertaken them believe it is the only possible
means of prolonging the life of a patient whose original heart has become
diseased. In some cases, as in those of Dr. Blaiberg (who survived 563
days, dying August 17, 1969) and a former professional tennis player who
was able, subsequent to a heart transplant, to resume his career, the results
have been remarkable, making the patient feel as if he has been reborn.23
However, such a patient must live with the fear that the new organ may
suddenly be rejected. Furthermore, in at least two instances patients have
had to undergo two heart transplants. 24 These problems, plus the fact that
only about half of the patients have remained alive, make the practicality
of undertaking transplants questionable.25
To add to the difficulty, the supply of available donors does not meet
the demands of the recipients. For example, potential recipients requiring
kidney transplants are expected to be 5,000 annually by 1977.26 Among
Americans aged 15 to 64, there are 200,000 deaths each year from acquired
or congenital heart disease, with 160,000 of these deaths due to coronary
heart disease. Over 80,000 of these people die before reaching the hospital.
Among those who survive to be hospitalized, 80,000 with coronary heart
disease and 40,000 with other forms of cardiac diseases may need some
form of therapy not available. Though it is difficult to determine from the
vital statistics precisely how many would have been saved by modern ther-
apy, with intensive care it might have been as many as 40,000 of the total
120,000. The number of patients requiring cardiac replacement may be as
few as 10,000 or as many as 50,000 of the total 120,000. National surveys
indicate that 70 percent of the population are willing to donate their bodies
for medical research and therapy. However, the total pool of donors
21. Shenker, Expert Says Some Heart Recipients Suffer Psychosis Afterward, N.Y.
Times, May 8, 1969, at 37, col. 1.
22. Weathersbee, Double-Edged Knife: Rejection/Infection, 93 Sm. NEws 215 (1968);
ALG: Protection But Set, 206 J.A.M.A. 494 (1968); New Techniques Have Enabled Early
Detection of Rejection, HosPiTAL TRIBUNE, July 14, 1969, at 19.
23. Bradbury, With Other People's Hearts, Lmsa, Jan. 10, 1969, at 82a; Heart Trans-
plant May Turn Net Pro, Chicago American, Feb. 9, 1969, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
24. Two Patients, Six Hearts, MED. WoRLD NEWS, Dec. 13, 1968, at 31.
25. Fishbein, Before Barnard-and After, MED. Wourm NEWS, Dec. 27, 1968, at 64.
26. 115 Co=G. REC. S1500 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1969).
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-those dying from all causes. other than heart disease or cancer age 15
to 64-comprises only 260,000 including many who would not be suitable
donors. If donors continue to be derived largely from victims of trauma
or spontaneous brain damage, only about 67,000 potential donors will be
available annually. There is also the problem of organ transportation and
preservation, as well as a need for the development of efficient matching
systems." Only one death out of ten will provide a heart potentially suit-
able for transplanting. A greater number of heart patients also suffer
from lung diseases and may require lung transplants as well. Some phy-
sicians conceive of .a. complete heart and lung transplant. 28
Heart and other organ transplanting involves a myriad of ethical,
social, and legal problems. One ethical question was answered by Dr.
Barnard and other surgeons simply by proceeding with transplants. They
stated that, in their opinion, medical knowledge and technology had ar-
rived at the point where such a task could be undertaken with a reason-
able chance of success. This view is not universally shared by medical
authorities. Apparently, much less agreement exists as to the state of the
art with regard to the implanting of an artificial heart, as attempted
by Dr. Denton Cooley to preserve life pending the availability of a
human heart. He was criticized by Dr. DeBakey for use of such a device
prior to full testing and approval.29
Assuming an adequate success ratio can be attained in transplants,
a problem arises as to who is to be entitled to the scarce transplant re-
sources and where are the donors to be found. Since transplants are radi-
cal undertakings, a patient should be determined to be in need of a
transplant, particularly a heart transplant, only after careful and thorough
diagnosis. In some instances, patients who have been diagnosed to have
a hopelessly damaged heart have manifested remarkable recovery. Given
a number of patients in need of transplants, a problem arises as to who is
to receive priority, in other words, how, and by whom, is the decision to
be made as to who should live. Not only is there the problem of a scarcity
of donors, but there is also a scarcity of medical resources. The operative
and post operative care is exceedingly expensive. Only a limited number
of medical centers are equipped for undertaking transplants.
The most pressing problem is finding a qualified donor. Though a
kidney donor may contribute a kidney without loss of life, it is obviously
impossible for the donor of a primary organ, such as a heart or lung to
survive. Since it is morally reprehensible to arbitrarily select living indi-
viduals' and "remove" their hearts, or lungs for transplantation, the donor
must be in a condition such that his life has ceased but his heart can still
be preserved for a transplant, i.e., still functioning. This requires a defi-
nition of what constitutes death. The issue is too important merely to
27. Id.
28.. See not e 25 supra.
29. Lerner, Ethics of Transplants, Chicagg Sun Times, Apr.. 17, 1969, at 92, col. 1.
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leave, as Dr. Barnard suggests, to the determination of the physician."
Guidelines need to be developed as prospective recipients of transplants
lie and wait.3 ' Transplants are being undertaken with doubt, in many
instances, as to whether the donor was indeed dead. Organs have been
"cannibalized" in some cases with heart, kidneys, liver, and corneas
removed from one donor for use by several recipients."
Guidelines are necessary to protect both the surgeons and the donors.
The individual patients (or his relatives) may fear entering a hospital
lest his life be unnecessarily shortened. The current controversy regard-
ing what constitutes death is demonstrated by the increased apprehension
in recent years, of being buried alive. 3 The surgeon and the hospital
may also fear 'being subject to a charge of murder or a civil action by
relatives. The circumstances under which Dr. Barnard removed the heart
of Olive Haupt for the transplant to Dr. Philip Blaiberg, without the
consent of the widow, though with the mother's approval, might have
exposed American surgeons to possible legal liability.34 The problem was
succinctly reported by Medical World News:
In Israel relatives of a heart donor accused surgeons of murder-
ing the patient to obtain his heart. Japan's only cardiac trans-
planter, Juro Wada, was charged with double murder-that of
the donor and the recipient. In Houston, attorneys for two
youths indicted for killing a man whose heart was later trans-
planted contended that Dr. Denton Cooley's team removed the
organ while the man was still alive.
In a situation rife with possibilities for malpractice suits,
a legislative committee in Texas-where most of America's
heart transplants have been done-has asked the Texas Insur-
ance Commission to poll all insurance companies doing business
in that state. The question: What are their policies concerning
professional liability coverage for members of transplant teams?
The committee decided to act after learning that the Medi-
cal Protective Insurance Co. had cancelled coverage for Dr.
Cooley's co-workers last June after they had performed a cardiac
graft. The physicians were able to get new protection from
Hartford Insurance, Dr. Cooley's carrier, but at a much higher
rate ....
Although no actual malpractice claims have arisen from
heart transplants ... the possibility of one came up in the very
first operation done in Houston. The donor, a 15 year old girl
had committed suicide by shooting herself in the head. After
30. A Day in the Life of Christian Barnard, MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 25, 1968, at 38.
31. Dozens Waiting for Heart Donors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 1. •
32. Planning for Transplants, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1969, at 42, col. 2; Transplant
Rounds, MED. WoRLD NEWS, Mar. 14, 1969, at 53.
33. Snider, Fear of Being Buried Alive is Growing, Chicago Daily News, Nov. 25, 1968,
at 13, col. 3.
34. David, When is A Transplant Legal Murder?, Chicago Daily News, Nov. 17, 1968,
(This Week Magazine) at 3.
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the transplant was done, the girl's family went to the local TV
station, claiming that the doctors had not tried hard enough to
save her lost life. When the station refused to air the story, they
turned to the publicized criminal lawyer, Percy Foreman, but
he would not touch the case. Nothing further ever came of it. 5
Traditionally, death has been commonly regarded as occurring when
the heart stops functioning. However, the law is unclear as to what con-
stitutes death.8 6 Dr. Barnard defines death as when all bodily reflexes
cease. 7 Many physicians, though, define the point of death as when the
brain ceases to function as manifested by a continuously flat electro-
encephalogram.8s
In addition to defining the point of death, a problem arises as to right
of access to the body of the donor. Organs may not be taken without the
consent of the next of kin. There is even doubt as to whether an individ-
ual, during his life has a property right in his body which he may will to
medical science upon his death.
Problems which have arisen have prompted medical societies to for-
mulate guidelines for the conduct of medical research. Lawyers have also
become concerned with the problems and are seeking through legislative
mechanisms to resolve them. Since the greater portion of medical research,
including transplants, involves grants from agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment, the problem has national implications. Accordingly, Senator
Mondale has introduced a resolution calling for the establishment of a
commission to investigate transplant problems and to suggest guidelines. 9
The efforts of medical groups to formulate guidelines will be explored
first, followed by a discussion of the state of the law and suggestions for
legal reform.
III. PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL GUIDELINES
Because of the investigative and experimental aspects of human tissue
and organ transplantation, the clinical practice of transplantation is sub-
35. Transplant Rounds, MED. WORLD NEWS, March 14, 1969, at 53.
36. See note 34 supra.
37. See note 30 supra.
38. Cooley, Observations of A Heart Surgeon, Chicago Daily News, June 22, 1969,
(This Week Magazine) at 7.
39. 115 CONG. REc. S1558 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1969). One physician, in commenting on
Senator Mondale's Resolution, states:
Among 150 persons, mostly Deans, answering Mondale's questionnaire, 137 supported
the idea, which makes me wonder how many were influenced by the thought that
they would be opposing something influential legislators might want. I should not
be so cynical but experience has taught me something I Apparently, the hope was
that from such a study would come legislation to control transplantation, among
other things. This assumes a degree of omniscience well beyond anything I know.
There are already a plethora of committees, task forces, and the like discussing
transplantation. It would be surprising if they discovered anything new. Their
chief function seems to me to codify all that is known and bring it to our attention
for discussion. This is a valuable function.
Page, The Ethics oj Heart Transplantation, A Personal View, 207 J.A.M.A. 109, 113 (1969).
See also Comment, California's Response to the Problems of Procuring Human Remains
for Transplantation, 57 CAMaw. L. Rxv. 671 (1969).
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ject to the codes of ethics for conducting clinical research, particularly the
Niiremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the statement of the
Medical Research Council of Great Britain." These professional codes,
judging from the extent to which they have been followed, appear to be
good examples of effective self-government. The principles embodied in
the Niiremberg Articles have been reformulated by International and na-
tional medical bodies4 and have been reflected in a policy statement by
the Surgeon General of the United States in which requirements for review
to insure the rights of individuals involved in clinical research were set
forth.42 This statement stipulated that no grants supporting research were
to be continued or awarded unless arrangements were made for consider-
ation of proposals for research involving human subjects by the grantee's
40. World Medical Association, Code oj Ethics of the World Medical Association
(Declaration of Helsinki), 2 BRIT. MED. J. 177 (1964) (accepted at Helsinki in June 1964);
Medical Research Council, Responsibility in Investigations on Human Subjects, 2 BaIT.
MED. J. 178 (1964) (statement in Annual Report for 1962-63). See also Ladimer, Ethical
and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J. PuB. L. 467, 471, 497 (1954).
Trials of War Criminals Before the Niiremburg Military Tribunals Under Control Council
Law No. 10, 2 THE MED. CASE 181 (1949), in Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169
J.A.M.A. 461, 472 (1959); The Niiremberg Articles, drafted by a committee of the
American Medical Association, comprise ten points, set up in the form of accepted and
established principles to deal with non-therapeutic research as a guide for the Nllrem-
tribunals in trying Nazi criminals. Ten Articles provide, inter alia, for voluntary consent
by each subject of experimentation; that human subjects be used only when fruitful results
for the good of society unprocurable by other means may be promoted; that experiments
must be based upon prior animal experimentation and upon knowledge of the natural
history of the problem; that there be avoidance of unnecessary physical and mental
suffering; that no experiments be made which involve the likelihood of death or disabling
injury; that the risk must be set off against and not exceed the humanitarian importance
of the project; that proper preparation and facilities be provided; that only scientifically
qualified investigation be used; that the subject of investigation must be free to withdraw
at any time; and that assurance must be given that the investigators will terminate the
project at any time it seems to be getting out of hand.
41. The American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics in 1946 reflected
the principles of the Niiremberg Code, 132 J.A.M.A. 1090 (1946). In 1953, the National
Institutes of Health, established Guiding Principles in Medical Research Involving Humans
which required group review of the scientific and ethical propriety of projects deviating
from accepted medical practice. See Stason, Role of Law in Medical Progress, 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 563, 568 (1967). The Public Health Council of the Netherlands Report
on Human Experimentation forbade all experiments on the dying under any circumstances.
Ladimer & Newman, Clinical Investigations in Medicine 15608 (1963). A document, second
only to the Nilremberg Articles in importance, is the Declaration of Helsinki, Code of Ethics
of the World Medical Association, adopted in 1964 and approved by the American Medical
Association, the American Federations for Clinical Research, the American College of Phy-
sicians, the American College of Surgeons, the Society for Pediatric Research, and the
American Academy of Pediatrics. The Declaration distinguishes between purely scientific
experimentation, presumably on normal persons, and experimentation for therapeutic pur-
poses carried out on patients under the doctor's care, patients whose illness does not yield
to conventional treatments, with more exacting standards imposed on the former than the
latter. See Stason, Role of Law In Medical Progress, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 563, 589
(1967); 2 BaIT. MED. J. 178 (1964).
42. Memorandum on Group Consideration and Informed Consent in Clinical Research
at Nat'l Inst. of Health, from the Dir. Surgeon General Public Health Service, Dep't of
Health, Education & Welfare, INVESTIGATION INVOLVING HuMAN SUBJECTS, INCLUDING
CLINICAL RESEARCH; REQUIREMENT OF REVIEW TO INSURE THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF
INDIVIDUALS, U.S. Public Health Service, Policy and Procedure Order No. 129 (July 1,
1966).
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institutional associates; that appropriate methods be used to obtain the
informed consent of the prospective donee or his representatives, and that
the risks of the procedure be proportionate to the potential medical ben-
efits. The office of the Director of the National Institute of Health issued
a memorandum 43 outlining the group consideration and informed consent
practices which provides for an ascending heirarchy of committees to re-
view all research projects involving the participation of normal volunteers,
therapeutic or diagnostic studies of unusual hazards, and such non-diag-
nostic, non-therapeutic studies involving patients which might be referred.
Guidelines for the voluntary and informed consent of patients were stipu-
lated. The underlying principles included group consideration, informed
consent of the patient and the volunteer, and the freedom of subjects to
withdraw from a project at any time.
The Food and Drug Administration, pursuant to regulations issued
under the authority of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 44 requires the
written consent of the patient before experimental drugs can be adminis-
tered.45 The regulation sets forth criteria for judging meaningful consent
and provides examples of instances where exceptions to the written con-
sent requirement may be made by the physician. Other guidelines are pro-
vided by statutes, codes of professional ethics, and in the professional
practices of outstanding institutions.4
With regard to heart transplants, the American Medical Associa-
tion's House of Delegates has issued guidelines which provide that the
determination of death of a heart transplant donor must be made by at
least two physicians not associated with the surgical team performing the
transplant and that heart transplants should be restricted to patients for
whom there is no other life-sustaining therapy. The original statement
defined the criteria of death as a flat electroencephalogram, indicating no
activity of the brain, a cessation of breathing without mechanical assis-
tance, failing blood pressure, lack of reflexes, and the dilation and fixation
of the pupils. This was subsequently modified by adding the following
criteria: "The cause of death must be evident and irreversible. The fact
of death must be established and must be demonstrated by adequate, cur-
rent and acceptable scientific evidence in the opinion of the physician
making the determination. '48 The modification eliminated an assertion in
43. U.S. Public Health Service, Policy and Procedure Order No. 129 (July 1, 1966).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (1964).
45. 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (1967).
46. See Fletcher, Human Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation, 32 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 620 (1967).
47. A.M.A. Sets Guide on Heart Implants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
48. A.M.A. Rules on Death and Issues Guidelines on Heart Transplants, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 5, 1968, at 31; 205 J.A.M.A. 341 (1968). The Judicial Council of the AMA offers
the following statement for guidance of physicians as they seek to maintain the highest
level of ethical conduct in their practices.
1. In all professional relationships between a physician and his patient, the phy-
sician's primary concern must be the health of his patient. He owes the patient his
primary allegiance. This concern and allegiance must be preserved in all medical
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the original draft that one of the two physicians determining death should
be a neurosurgeon or neurologist. The American Medical Association also
recommended that a transplant registry be established and that uniform
laws be enacted to facilitate the donation of organs. The American Med-
ical Association resolution further provided that institutions engaging in
heart transplantation must have adequate background in animal research,
adequate sources of drugs to prevent the implanted heart from being re-
jected, and adequate follow-up and evaluation of the progress of the pa-
tient. The statement additionally asserted that heart implantation must
be regarded as investigative since it is still too early to determine if an
alternative method would yield better long term results. Continued re-
search on methods of organ storage was urged and the development of
artificial hearts and cardiac assist devices was stressed. It was also sug-
gested that the feasibility of using xenografts-organs from animals-
should be explored.
Delegates from 60 countries met in Sydney, Australia, at a conference
of the World Medical Organization and issued a similarly vague statement
procedures, including those which involve the transplantation of an organ from
one person to another where both donor and recipient are patients. Care must,
therefore, be taken to protect the rights of both the donor and the recipient, and
no physician may assume a responsibility in organ transplantation unless the rights
of both donor and recipient are equally protected.
2. A prospective organ transplant offers no justification for relaxation of the usual
standards of medical care. The physician should provide his patient, who may be
a prospective organ donor, with that care usually given others being treated for
a similar injury or disease.
3. When a vital, single organ is to be transplanted, the death of the donor shall
have been determined by at least one physician other than the recipient's physician.
Death shall be determined by the clinical judgment of the physician. In making this
determination, the ethical physician will use all available, currently accepted sci-
entific tests.
4. Full discussion of the proposed procedure with the donor and the recipient or
their responsible relatives or representatives is mandatory. The physician should be
objective in discussing the procedure, in disclosing known risks and possible hazards,
and in advising of the alternative procedures available. The physicians should not
encourage expectations beyond those which the circumstances justify. The phy-
sician's interest in advancing scientific knowledge must always be secondary to his
primary concern for the patient.
5. Transplant procedures of body organs should be undertaken (a) only by physi-
cians who possess special medical knowledge and technical competence developed
through special training, study and laboratory experience and practice, and (b) in
medical institutions with facilities adequate to protect the health and well-being of
the parties to the procedure.
6. Transplantation of body organs should be undertaken only after careful evalua-
tion of the availability and effectiveness of other possible therapy.
7. Medicine recognizes that organ transplants are newsworthy and that the public
is entitled to be correctly informed about them. Normally, a scientific report of the
procedures should first be made to the medical profession for review and evaluation.
When dramatic aspects of medical advances prevent adherence to accepted pro-
cedures, objective, factual, and discreet public reports to the communications media
may be made by a properly authorized physician, but should be followed as
soon as possible by full scientific reports to the profession.
In organ transplantation procedures, the right of privacy of the parties to the procedures
must be respected. Without their authorization to disclose their identity, the physician is
limited to an impersonal discussion of the procedure.
. Reporting of medical and surgical procedures should always be objective and factual.
Such reporting will also preserve and enhance the stature of the medical profession and its
service to mankind.
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as to what constituted death. They also stipulated that two physicians not
connected with the organ transplant team must make the final determina-
tion of death. The World Medical Organization statement provided that
the use of the electroencephalograph, a device to measure brain activity,
would be a helpful indication and stressed that the donor must be under-
going an "irreversible process." 49
The American College of Surgeons has undertaken the development
of a transplant registry in Chicago for all organs, except kidneys (which
are already accounted for by a registry in Boston). Besides "census in-
formation," the transplant registry will solicit data concerning the clinical
indications for each transplant, the postoperative condition of the patient
and donor, histo-compatibility typing and matching methods, surgical
technique, and postoperative course, including rejection and countermea-
sures. Long term followups will be used to determine the degree of func-
tional recovery, rehabilitation, and recurrence, if any, of the original
disease.50 A computer program has also been developed to classify the
availability of organs for transplants according to a pattern utilizing 58
basic tissue types. 51 These developments involve a classification and co-
ordination of data which will help physicians and surgeons in formu-
lating and applying guidelines.
The heart transplant surgeons themselves convened in Capetown to
pool their information.52 The consensus was that cardiac transplantation
should be reserved for end-stage heart disease and that advanced coro-
nary artery disease is the primary indication of such disease. Most sur-
geons agreed that pulmonary hypertension and congestion resulting from
long term pulmonary vascular obstruction were the greatest threats to
a successful transplant. However, the severity of these lung disorders
does not always determine prognosis. The conference indicated that
tissue typing cannot be considered the sole determinant for selecting
donors and recipients since so little is known about it. The surgeons
agree that donors must have a normal heart with no evidence of func-
tional or organic heart disease or other transferrable disease and that
the condition of the donor's heart was more important than its chrono-
logical age. In determining the donor's death, all surgeons attending
the conference agreed that neurological examination and electroencephalo-
graph tracings should show no signs of cerebral activity, but the surgeons
failed to set the length of time for this inactivity. In most heart trans-
49. See Wecht & Aranson, Medical Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplanta-
tion, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 488, 493 (1969).
50. Transplant Rounds, MED. WORLD NEws, Jan. 10, 1969, at 26.
51. Computers to Decide Who'll Get Transplants, Chicago American, June 6, 1968.
The program is a joint effort of the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois, and
the University of Wisconsin and involves the establishment of tissue typing laboratories in
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Madison.
52. Cooley, Minutes of the Cape Town Meeting, MED. WoniD NEWS, Aug. 9, 1968, at
21.
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plants, this period exceeds two hours.53 The group concurred that respira-
tory and circulatory failure are equally as important as the absence of
brain stem function. The surgeons also concurred that to avoid injuring
the myocardium, no further heart stimulants should be administered
once death has been established.
Traditionally, however, physicians are disinclined toward decision-
making. 4 The physician's very professionalism generates doubts as to
his qualifications for nonmedical decisionmaking, especially in light of
the need for speed. This has generated a system of authoritarian ex parte
behavior. The medical student is taught to respect authoritarian control.
Advancement to decisionmaking roles goes only to the most technically
skilled individuals and is achieved through unusual financial, physical,
and emotional sacrifice. Furthermore, the most proficient physician may
judge his fellow man by a perverse value system but, if in authority,
his decisions will be accepted by his fellow doctors. It seems apparent,
at least with respect to the earlier mentioned life or death matters, that
one man's decision should not have the finality which the medical decision-
making structure accords to the decision of the physician in charge.
The decisionmaking function might be conferred on laymen, but even
then guidelines would have to be developed. Such guidelines must be
made by law.
IV. LEGAL GUIDELINES
As a preface to the following legal view of death, it is pertinent
to note that, in the legal vernacular, there are several types of death.
Where a defendant was sentenced to prison for life, he suffered civil
death-"a deprivation of all rights whose exercise or enjoyment depends
upon some provision of positive law." 5 A death would be labeled violent
"if it resulted by reason of an external agency and was not in the ordinary
course of nature."55 In other words, natural death and violent death
are mutually exclusive. Natural death is the relevant classification for
legal analysis of the death concept.
The standard medical and legal definitions of death are fairly con-
sistent and are equally resistant to change. As evidenced by the following
legal dictionary excerpt, the law based its definition of death upon the
traditional medical concept. Death is
the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians
as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessa-
53. Id. Dr. Cooley observed that in two of his donors there was a flattened EEG for
four days prior to transplantation.
54. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 620, 633 (1969).
55. In re Donnelly's Estate, 125 Cal. 417, 419, 58 P. 61, 62 (1899). See also Avery v.
Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 319, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (1888).
56. Caffaro v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 167, 170, 183. A. 200, 201
(1936).
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tion of the animal and vital functions consequent thereto, such
as respiration, pulsation, etc.
57
In Smith v. Smith,58 the Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted ver-
batim the legal dictionary definition of death as controlling, thus in-
stitutionalizing the medical concept of heart death as law. The courts
uniformly interpret death as "the complete cessation of all vital func-
tions without possibility of resuscitation."5 In actuality, all other defi-
nitions are routinely rejected. For example, in In Re Estate of Schmidt,6"
the medical experts could not agree on the time of death because they
used different theories. The court categorically dismissed the "opinion
of[ some] medical experts [that] death might be the inability to re-
suscitate or an irreversible coma" 1 and considered Black's Dictionary
as the ultimate authority.
A body is not dead, even though the brain may quit functioning,
so long as there is a heart beat and that may be evidenced by
the gushing of blood in spurts.62
Furthermore, even where medical testimony appears to the contrary,
the court will not determine if one is dead if lay testimony shows that
"blood pumped rhythm-like from the person's body.'03 The result of
this absurdity is that laymen, rather than physicians, can pronounce
legal death. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School
summarized the present state of law in America regarding death. In
judicially noticing Black's definition of death, as the Arkansas Supreme
Court did in Smith v. Smith,
64
the court did not consider that definition open to serious con-
troversy; it considered the question as settled in responsible
scientific and medical circles. . . . [The court] considered the
definition of death to be a settled, scientific, biological fact. It
refused to consider the plaintiff's offer of evidence that 'modern
medical science' might say otherwise.65
The inflexibility of the law to adapt to progressive medical and
scientific theory is visible in the determination of the time of death.
In the legal sphere, "death occurs precisely when life ceases and does
not occur until the heart stops beating and respiration ends. Death is
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4 ed. 1968).
58. 299 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958).
59. United Trust v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 4, 427 P.2d 67, 71 (1967); Vaegemast v. Hess,
203 Minn. 207, 210, 280 N.W. 641, 643 (1938); Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 194 P.2d
542, 547 (Cal. 2d Dist. 1948).
60. 67 Cal. Reptr. 847 (Ct. App. 1968).
61. Id. at 854.
62. Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
63. Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961).
64. See note 56, supra.
65. A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JA.MA. 337, 339 (1968).
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not a continuing event and is an event that takes place at a precise
time.""8 Whereas, in "the medical profession ... death is a process and
not a moment in time as the law believes. '6 7 The Declaration of Sydney,
which was "adopted by the Twenty-Second World Medical Assembly
in August 1968" stated that "death is a gradual process at the cellular
level with tissues varying in their ability to withstand deprivation of
oxygen.'08 The decisional lag is self-evident.
The divergence of traditional heart death and modern brain death
poses significant legal ramifications to the transplant surgeon. A case
on point portrays the medical-legal dilemma.
[I]n Houston ... the heart of the victim of an assault, who had
suffered irreversible brain damage, was kept beating by artifi-
cial means until a transplant could be performed. The coroner
chose to certify the death on the basis of the cessation of heart
function. The District Attorney was faced with the problem of
whether a defendant can be tried for homicide when under
present medical [and legal] standards the victim actually died
under the transplant surgeon's knife."9
There are other reported cases involving a similar fact pattern of organ
removal after brain death but before heart death.70 The ability to artifi-
cially maintain circulation and respiration confuses the issue, and, con-
sequently, the surgeon assumes the onerous burden of balancing medical
success with possible legal repercussions.
When the brain-damaged patient is subjected to life-supporting
techniques, there may be a choice of establishing death from
cessation of brain activity or cardiac activity, and the time
interval may extend to hours or occasionally days. This can
have considerable juridical consequences and it goes to the roots
of the death concept itself.'
In terms of legal consequences to the transplant team, one legal scholar
views the physician's situation as perilous. "In the present state of the
law I could only advise a client [surgeon] that he would incur the danger
of a possible charge of homicide if by removal of an organ he causes
. 66. Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 482 (1950). See also
Sanger v. Butler, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 532-33, 101 S.W. 459, 462 (1907) ; Gugel's Adm'r
v. Orth's Ex'r, 236 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950).
67. Muller, Legal Medicine and the Determination of Death, 14 WORLD MED. J. 140
(1967).
68. Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation,
18 DEPAu. L. REv. 488, 493 (1969).
69. Ford, Human Organ Transplantation: Legal Aspects, 15 CATH. LAWYER 136, 141
(1969).
70. See Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplanta-
tion, 14 CLav.-MAR. L. REV. 442, 467 (1965); Louisel, Transplantation: Existing Legal
Constraints in ETHICS Hq MEDICAL PROGRESS 92-93 (Ciba Foundation 1966) (both articles
illustrate the removal of a kidney for transplantation before conventional death occurred).
71. Biorck, When is Death?, 18 Wis. L. R. 484, 494 (1968).
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death, if life still continues in the conventional sense. 7 In other words,
removal of a heart while it was still beating might subject the doctor
performing the transplant to both civil and criminal liability.
The problem of the time of death has arisen in other contexts as
well as in regard to transplants, since patients are now revived who for-
merly might have been pronounced dead. Situations have been created
where patients are kept alive by artificial means; as a result, question
has been raised in some cases as to whether the treatment was carried too
far.73 On the other hand, the doctor may do certain acts wilfully and
voluntarily, knowing that as a direct result of these acts the patient will
die. Unless he has some defense, he has committed murder.74
Generally, the criminal law requires an individual to act only in
limited circumstances and he is free to omit all but the most basic and
ordinary acts expected of one standing in his relationship to another. If,
in the doctor-patient relationship, the doctor fails to give a certain treat-
ment, he has merely made a value judgment in accordance with his train-
ing.75 The mens rea required for a criminal conviction is lacking and,
thus, there has been no known case where a doctor has been successfully
prosecuted for omitting a treatment. If, however, the doctor disconnects
the resuscitating machine, he commits an act of commission rather than
omission, although he still may not be criminally culpable.
The law characterizes behavior as a commission when it alters the
normal course of events and as an omission when it permits the normal
course to be run. 6 If in the absence of treatment, death would ensue in
the normal course of events, the law could deny culpability as long as
the condition was irreversibly fatal, or if the treatment would not have
reversed the patient's deteriorating condition.77
The physician's lack of culpability depends on the special circum-
stances of medical treatment and not on whether the act can be charac-
terized as an omission. Doctors generally explain their freedom from
culpability on the ground that the termination of treatment is always
an omission. A simpler principle would be that a homicide resulting from
the termination of treatment is justified whenever the withholding of
treatment would have been justified. The suggestion has been made that
the justification of "necessity" be made available where the doctor, lack-
ing sufficient resources, switches one patient's resources to another,
causing the death of the former.7 Though such justification has been
72. Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints in ETHIcs IN MEDICAL PRo-
GRESS 98 (Ciba Foundation 1966).
73. Stickel, Organ Transplantation in Medical and Legal Perspectives, 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 597, 600 (1967).
74. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 CoLum. L. REV. 620, 624 (1969).
75. Kanisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation,
42 MiNN. L. REV. 969, 982 (1958).
76. Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958); see note 59 supra, at 626.
77. See note 54, supra.
78. See note 74, supra.
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rejected by the courts,"9 the Model Penal Code provides an acceptable
rationale for the physician-controlled death in those cases where the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."0
Applying these observations to heart and other organ transplants,
a situation arises where patient A has incurred an injury to his brain;
his reflexes and reactions cease; his bodily functions (e.g., breathing,
circulation and heart beat) are maintained by resuscitating machines
and other supporting mechanisms; the brain indicates a continuing flat
electroencephalogram; the prognosis for revival is nil and further de-
terioration of the patient's condition is to be anticipated. The heart,
however, is in good condition. Assuming there is no inclination to per-
form an organ transplant, continued care of such a patient subjects his
relatives to unnecessary emotional strain and devotes scarce hospital
resources to a purpose bordering on the macabre. Under such circum-
stances, the doctor might be justified in disconnecting the supporting
mechanism and permitting bodily functions to cease. Clearly, the doctor
would not be criminally culpable. He would be regarded as having com-
mitted acts of omission.
Assume another element in this scenario: Patient B, who has a
diseased heart, faces certain death within six months. The odds are 50-50
or 40-60 that he would enjoy a prolonged and productive life with a
cardiac transplant. If, instead of merely disconnecting patient A's sup-
porting mechanism the doctor chooses to remove A's heart for use by
B, he should still not be regarded as having committed homicide. Patient
A could be determined to be dead at the point where his brain had
ceased functioning as indicated by his lack of reflexes and bodily re-
sponses, a flat electroencephalogram, and a prognosis that the probability
of recovery was nil and there was irreversible bodily decay.
The disconnecting of the supporting mechanism for patient A, in
the absence of further treatment would, in the normal course, result
in total bodily deterioration and death. The removal of A's heart would
be regarded as an anticipation of the normal course of events. From
another perspective, the Model Penal Code analogy might be applied
in that permitting the total deterioration of A with the resultant loss
of the use of his heart (a scarce resource) would be a greater evil than
removing the heart to save B. Clearly, the determination in these cases
involves moral and legal values requiring procedures for decisionmaking.
Since criminal prosecutions are virtually nonexistant and unlikely
to occur,"' the physician or the hospital is most likely to be confronted
with a tort action by the estate of patient A. Tort law has been most
79. Reginia v. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas.
360 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (P.O.D. 1962) and at 5-10 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1968).
81. See note 75 supra, at 992.
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active in doctor-patient relationships.82 Malpractice doctrines require that
the doctor provide a level of care not substantially less than that gener-
ally available.83 Therefore, if the supporting mechanisms are not gen-
erally available, the doctor is not liable if such treatment is not provided
to A. If, however, such treatment becomes generally available, liability
would arise if the doctor failed to provide it.
The doctor may also be subjected to a contractual liability, based
upon the theory that the doctor owes his patient the duty to make a
proper determination as to when to terminate the relationship.84 A breach
of this duty arises when the doctor discharges a patient prematurely
or discontinues treatment without giving him the opportunity to secure
other care.8 5 An abandonment may occur even if the doctor does not
formally remove himself from the case.8" The decision of the doctor to
disconnect the supporting mechanism could be considered such an aban-
donment. If, however, the prospective donor, A, could not get alternative
care, no damage would be done. The court could imply a duty to con-
tinue unto death an extraordinary treatment only when A or his relatives
employed the doctor in reliance upon that treatment being provided.
Moreover, if the doctor acts to make patient A's heart available for
heart transplantation, a breach of fiduciary duty may arise in that the
doctor's primary duty is to protect and treat A; a conflict of interests
arises where the physician treats both the donor and the donee.
As to hospital liability, private hospitals have no duty to furnish
services to everyone,87 but when a hospital opens an emergency room
it undertakes to provide emergency care to the community.88 Tort law
requires the completion of an undertaking only when abandonment in
midcourse would leave the patient in worse condition than he would
have been in but for the undertaking. 9 The termination of care for A,
the donor, would hardly leave him in any worse condition. In addition,
the cause of A's death could be said to be the brain damage so that no
wrongful death action could ensue for the dissection of the heart.
Hospitals may also be liable under the civil rights actionsf ° The
82. Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1302 (1964); Schroeder, Insurance Protection and Damage Awards in Medical Mal-
practice, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 332 (1964). See also Halley & Harvey, On an Interdisciplinary
Solution to the Legal-Medical Definitional Dilemma in Death, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 219 (1969);
Ford, Human Organ Transplantation: Legal Aspects, 15 CATH. LAWYER 136 (1969).
83. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VANO. L. REV. 549 (1959);
Shermon, The Standard of Care in Malpractice Cases, 4 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 222 (1966).
84. Levin, The Abandoned Patient, 1965 INS. L.J. 275; see note 74 supra, at 630.
85. Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1968) ; LeJeune Rd. Hosp. v. Watson,
171 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Carroll v. Griffin, 96 Ga. App. 826, 101 S.E.2d 764
(1958); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937).
86. Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1968).
87. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School v. Geoghegan, 281 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C.
1967).
88. Cf. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
89. See note 74 supra, at 629.
90. 42 U.S.C. 1983-95 (1964).
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element of state action clearly exists as to hospitals administered by
Federal, State or city Governments and, with the ever increasing degree
of government involvement in funding, the operations of private hospitals
may also involve state action." Accordingly, the estate of A may claim
a denial of his civil rights in that he was deprived of the right to life
as a result of the discontinuing or denial of supporting mechanisms and
the dissection of his heart. A denial of equal protection might also be
claimed in that he was not accorded the same care as patient B. How-
ever, courts would be unlikely to uphold such claims if A's condition
were so deteriorated as to constitute death. 2 If the hospital lacks pro-
cedural safeguards in making the determination, the court might deter-
mine this to be a denial of civil rights.
Another aspect of the legal problems of transplants involves the
right to dissect the body of the donor. Common law principles, which
originated in the English Ecclesiastical courts in the seventeenth century
and carried into common law courts, hold there are no property rights
in the dead human body. 3 However, certain private rights exist in the
next of kin which may be regarded as "quasi property."'94 These rights
involve the assurance of a dignified treatment of the body and a decent
burial. These rights belong first to the surviving spouse, then to the
children, and finally to the next of kin, unless a statute provides other-
wise. The person who has the right to possession of the body is entitled
to receive it in the same condition as when death occurred, unless the
right is modified by law.
Damages may be recovered from anyone who mutilates or dissects
a body, therefore, before a transplant may be undertaken, the surgeon
must receive the consent of the next of kin. If a person, during his life-
time, makes an ante-mortem gift of his whole body or a portion of it,
it will be a nullity under common law if the surviving next of kin object. 5
In most jurisdictions, the right of a person to dispose of his own body
is determined by statute.96 However, these statutes require compliance
with certain formalities which vary in each jurisdiction.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 7 was recently drafted to facilitate
transplants. It provides for a simplified donation procedure. The Act
lessens the witness requirements for ante-mortem gifts, makes donations
91. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. Center, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); see note 55 supra, at 631. Some courts have denied state
action: Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963); Mauer v.
Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (1967).
92. See note 74 supra, at 631.
93. Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 564,
569 (1967).
94. Finesilver, Organ Transplants: A Multi-Discipline Challenge, TRiAL MAGo., April/
May, 1969, at 41.
95. See note 78 supra.
96. Note, Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69 COLum L. REv. 693 (1969).
97. UNrFORm ANATOmICAL GnPT AcT (1968). See R. PoRzio, THE TRANSPLANT AcE
79-81 (1969).
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by will effective immediately without probate, renders witnesses un-
necessary when the donation is made by the next of kin, and allows the
gift to be made by a telegram, recorded telephonic, or other recorded
message. The Act also permits a donor to indicate his gift by carrying
a wallet card, thus providing the means by which the existence of a
donation may be quickly ascertained. 98 Any individual of sound mind
and 18 years of age or older may, under the Act, give all or any part
of his body to any hospital, surgeon or physician, accredited medical
or dental school, college or university or any bank or storage facility
for medical or dental education, research, advancement of medical or
dental science, therapy or transplantation, or to any specified individual
for therapy or transplantation needed by him. Next of kin, in order of
priority of persons available at time of death, and in the absence of
actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent or actual notice
of opposition by a member of the same or prior class include: (1) the
spouse; (2) an adult son or daughter; (3) either parent; (4) an adult
brother or sister; (4) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the
time of death; (6) any other person authorized or under obligation to
dispose of the body. If the donee has actual notice of contrary indications
by the decedent, or that a gift by a member of a class is opposed by
a member of the same class or a prior class, the donee shall not accept
the gift.
The Act does not provide a definition as to time of death. Instead,
it provides in section 7, subsection (b), page 19:
The time of death shall be determined by a physician who
tends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who
certifies the death. The physician shall not participate in the
procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
The commissioners who drafted the Act explain:
Subsection (b) [of section 7, page 19] leaves the deter-
mination of the time of death to the attending or certifying




Print or type name of donor
In the hope that I may help others, I hereby make this anatomical gift, if medically
acceptable, to take effect upon my death. The words and marks below indicate my
desires.
I give: (a) any needed organs or parts
(b) only the following organs or parts
Specify the organ(s) or part(s)
for the purposes of transplantation, therapy, medical research or education;
(c) - -y body for anatomical study if needed.
Limitations or
special wishes, if any:
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time when life terminates. This point is not subject to clear cut
definition and medical authorities are currently working toward
a consensus on the matter. Modern methods of cardiac pacing,
artificial respiration, artificial blood circulation and cardiac
stimulation can continue certain bodily systems and metabolism
far beyond spontaneous limits. The real question is when have
irreversible changes taken place that preclude return to normal
brain activity and self sustaining bodily functions. No reason-
able statutory definition is'possible. The answer depends upon
many variables, differing from case to case. Reliance must be
placed upon the judgment of the physician in attendance. The
Uniform Act so provides.
However, because time is short following death for a trans-
plant to be successful, the transplant team needs to remove
the critical organ as soon as possible. Hence, there is a possible
conflict of interest between the attending physician and the
transplant team, and accordingly subsection (b) excludes the
attending physician from any part in the transplant procedures.
Such a provision isolates the conflict of interest and is eminently
desirable. However, the language of the provision does not pre-
vent the donor's attending physician from communications with
the transplant team or other relevant donees. This communica-
tion is essential to permit the transfer of important knowledge
concerning the donor, for example, the nature of the disease
processes affecting the donor or the results of studies carried
out for tissue matching and other immunological dataY9
99. One writer, Bergen, makes the following observation:
Death, of course, is an emotionally charged subject. This may help to explain
the excessive concern about this question. Some physicians tend to believe that
they have a duty to take whatever heroic measures are necessary to continue a
patient's circulation, respiration, or other more minimal vital signs as long as pos-
sible regardless of the circumstances and regardless of any ultimate benefit to the
patient. The law, however, does not impose a duty of this kind. Most important,
the patient himself has a right to reject such measures if he is capable of making
his own decisions. If not, the physician may properly recommend to the family, in
appropriate circumstances, that the patient be permitted to die in peace, if it is
clear that he has no hope for a real meaningful restoration to health. In some in-
stances at least, what is thought to be a prolongation of life is in reality nothing
more than a prolongation of the process of dying, which would usually not be of
any realistic benefit to either the patient or his family.
The death of a patient is the termination of his human life. Human life is the
integrated functioning of a rational organism. Almost any part of this bundle of
integrated functions can stop temporarily and then be restored so that the organism
functions, as a whole. Some few functions can be lost permanently without really
eliminating the total of integrated functions recognized as human life. In few,
if any, instances do all functions terminate instantaneously at the same point of
time. Typically, the functions deteriorate one by one until all are ended. Philosoph-
ically, death might be defined as the point at which the deterioration of functions
becomes irreversible so that the organism can never again function as an integrated
rational organism. The law would probably accept this kind of a philosophic con-
cept if it had to, but it would prefer to rely upon the expert diagnosis and
opinion of the attending physician. After all, this is the physician's field.
It is generally understood that some cellular activity continues in the human
body for a substantial period of time after the body as a whole is indisputably
dead. For example, when the head is severed from the rest of the body. The con-
tinuation of this cellular activity in these circumstances is certainly not human
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The position taken by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws indicates that presently there is no consensus as
to the time of death.
100
The Act has been approved by both the American Bar Association
and the American Medical Association.'' It has been promoted by the
American Medical Association Liaison Committee to the American Bar
Association and the American Bar Association Committee. As of July
13, 1970, it had been enacted by the District of Columbia and 48 state
legislatures with Nebraska and Massachusetts the two remaining states
who have not adopted the Act.'0 2 However, the Act has been criticized
as being primarily concerned with the protection of the surgeon and
physician from liability rather than with the protection of the donor.'0 '
The position taken by the Commissioners reflects the problem
faced by medical men. On the one hand, there are the rights of the patient
who is a potential donor, while on the other hand, are the rights of the
patient who is a potential recipient and the needs of medical science
for tissue transplants. Every dead body is a virtual treasure house of
organs for medical use and a source' of knowledge for the advancement
of medicine. Even excluding the need for tissue transplants, a pressing
need exists for cadavers to further medical knowledge.0 4 For over 400
years, students desiring to become physicians and surgeons have needed
life. Similarly, other minimal bodily activities, particularly those sustained by arti-
ficial means, do not constitute human life. The exact dividing line at which bodily
activity becomes sufficiently significant and integrated to constitute human life, is
a medical question, not a legal one. To the lawyer it appears to be a question of
fact not subject to objective determination by a universally applicable scientific
test.
If there is such a test and physicians generally agree on it, the law will un-
doubtedly accept it. If not, the law will be governed by the opinion of the physi-
cians called upon as expert witnesses in the litigation in which the question is raised.
It appears, therefore, that the existing rules of law relating to medical practice
provide a practical framework within which scientific medicine can continue to ex-
plore and test the heart transplant procedures without undue restrictions or undue
legal risks. It is true that under the existing rules there are bound to be differences
of interpretation from one case to another and differences of opinion among expert
medical witnesses. These variances, however, are unavoidable no matter what legal
rules are established. No law has ever been enacted that did not require interpreta-
tion and did not result in a variety of different applications in different cases.
It would seem wise, therefore, for both the public and the medical profession
to rely on the existing laws governing medical practice to regulate the new phe-
nomenon of heart transplants. The existing laws may not be perfect, but they are
familiar and they do not provide practical and effective standards. If new laws
are enacted for heart transplants, they might be better or worse than those we now
have. Just because they are new, however, they will of necessity result in a period
of uncertainty until they have been tested and interpreted by the courts.
Bergen, Legal Regulation of Heart Transplants, 54 Dis. CHEST 19 (Oct. 1968).
100. Sadler, Sadler & Staso, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, A Model for Reform,
206 J.A.M.A. 2501, 2504 (1968).
101. See note 97 supra.
102. TImE, July 13, 1970, at 67.
103. Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SAT. REV. (Feb. 3, 1968), at 53. Sec-
tion 7(c) of the Act provides that a person who acts in good faith in accord with the
terms of the Act or of the anatomical gift laws of another state or foreign country is not
liable for any damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal pro-
ceeding for his act.
104. American Medical Association Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Leaving Your
Body to Medical Science, A Report on the Disposition of Dead Bodies (1963).
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to study cadavers in minute detail to prepare themselves for treating
living persons. At one time, the demand for cadavers so exceeded the
supply that grave robbing was big business, and, as a result, the dissec-
tion of bodies met with public indignation. 05 Around the 1830's anatomy
laws were enacted which provided that unclaimed bodies, under proper
conditions, could go to medical schools. Today, however, this supply
of cadavers has become inadequate. 06 The medical progress in tissue
transplants only serves to aggravate the problem.
The hope of the drafters of the Act was that contributions would
be encouraged. However, it is doubtful whether the effect of the Act
will be to provide an adequate supply of transplant organs. The best
donors would be the young, but they are also the ones who think the
least about death.0 7 In 1961, the British enacted the Human Tissue
Act 0 8 which is similar to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Seven years
after the passage of the Act a conference arranged by the British Minister
of Health concluded that the statute was not an adequate means for
satisfying the need for transplant organs. 0 9 The conference proposed
amending the Act to permit removal of organs without first seeking
family permission." 0 Legislation may be enacted which assumes consent
unless it is explicitly denied. It should be noted that any compulsory
taking of organs will involve constitutional questions as to the taking
of property, the free exercise of religious beliefs, and the right to pri-
vacy."' Such a statute would render even more pressing the problem
of determining the time of death.
V. A PROPOSAL
Law reform beyond that provided in the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (i.e., liberalizing accessibility to cadavers) should await further
experience under the Act. A continuing assessment should be made as
to the need for transplants and the development of alternative approaches
should be encouraged.
The problem of determining the time of death remains, and it in-
volves a definition of death as well as procedures geared toward resolv-
ing any lingering doubts as to the donor's death among relatives and
the general public. There is need for medical assurance that all life has
indeed ceased in the body from which the organs are to be taken for
transplant.
Generally, where transplants are not involved, death is determined
by a routine observation by the attending physician. However, public
concern has risen recently because of the ability to revive the heart beat
105. Diamond, Are We Ready to Leave our Bodies to the Next Generation?, 114
CONG. REC. 10418 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
106. See note 88 supra.
107. See note 96 supra, at 695.
108. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 54 (1961).
109. Foulkes, Organ Transplants, 118 NEw L.J. 486, 487 (1968).
110. Id.
111. See note 96 supra.
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
and to maintain the functioning of bodily organs after the brain has
apparently ceased to function. To permit a flat electroencephalogram
to be the only indication of death is simplistic in that instances have
been recorded where individuals, following a severe brain injury and
comatose state, have been revived.112 However, European specialists,
particularly Dr. G.P.J. Alexandre, indicate that pronouncement of cere-
bral death is permissible provided the following six criteria are met:
(1) complete bilateral mydriasis; (2) complete absence of reflexes, both
natural and in response to profound pain; (3) complete absence of
spontaneous respiration; (4) falling blood pressure, necessitating increas-
ing amounts of vasopressive drugs; (5) a flat electroencephalogram;13
and (6) measurement of oxygen consumed by the brain." 4
112. Beecher, Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278
N. ENG. J. MEn. 1425 (1968); 204 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968); Report by Rostoff and Schwab,
presented at Meeting of American Electro-encephalografic Society, Atlantic City, N.J., EEG
in Establishing Brain Death: Ten Year Report with Criteria and Legal Safeguards in 50
States, June 8, 1967.
With the increasing acceptance of brain death as a major criterion for pro-
nouncing a person dead, researchers are turning their attention to quicker and
surer ways of pinpointing the moment at which brain damage becomes irreversible.
Now a test developed at the University of Vienna may provide the answer in 30
minutes. The technique simply measures the difference in oxygen pressure between
a supplying artery and the bulbus venae jugularis. Blood samples are taken directly
from both the artery and the bulbus and are then subjected to blood gas analysis.
When irreparable brain damage has occurred, there should be either a small pres-
sure differential or none at all. In one recent accident case tested, for example,
the oxygen pressure differential (OPD) was 5 mm Hg-405 mm Hg in the artery
and 400 mm Hg in the jugular vein.
So far the method has been tried on 100 accident victims and ten organ donors.
In every case, the OPD technique has shown a 100% correlation with neurologic
and EEG tests that are generally given in six-hour cycles to determine death con-
clusively, according to Dr. Christo Tschakaloff, who developed the OPD test. Dr.
Tschakaloff, who is employed as an anesthesiologist in the intensive care unit of
the University of Vienna General Hospital, says that instrument fault might
make it possible to miss the exact moment of irreversible brain damage of a person
already dead, but it is impossible to mistakenly declare a living person dead. Mea-
suring the oxygen pressure gives a better indication of brain death than estimating
the blood's oxygen content. He chose the bulbus venae jugularis because all the
cranial blood vessels drain into it and because it can be punctured from either the
left or right side of the neck.
Since the OPD Technique shortens the time for reliable prediction of brain
damage, it should be most important in cases of potential organ donors. Another
use, suggested by Dr. Tschakaloff, would be to help doctors decide which of several
patients should have first call on equipment and services. But, at present, he em-
phasizes, the technique should only be used in conjunction with the classic methods
that are currently accepted for determination of brain damage.
MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Sept. 26, 1969, at 340. See also Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal
Ramifications oj Human Tissue Transplantation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 448, 491-92 (1969).
113. ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS 69 (Ciba Foundation 1966). See also Halley and
Harvey, Law-Medicine Comment; Anatomical Gifts, J. KAN. MED. Soc'Y, 1968, at 343. The
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School proposed similar criteria
for determining brain death, but omitted falling blood pressure and clarified the flat EEG
requirement to exclude the influence of sedation or anesthetic drugs. A Definition of Irre-
versible Coma, 205 JA.M.A. 337, 338 (1968). Dr. J. P. Revillard would add two addi-
tional criteria: "interruption of blood flow in the brain as judged by angiography, . . . and
the absence of reaction to atrophine." ETIcs IN MEDICAL PROGRESS 71 (Ciba Foundation
1966).
114. Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation,
18 DEPAUL L. REv. 488, 491-92 (1969); Stickel, Organ Transplantation in Medical and
Legal Perspectives, 32 LAW & CoNmsds. PaoD. 597, 606-07 (1967).
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These criteria could be woven into a statutory definition of the
time of death. The definition could be formulated to permit flexibility
to allow for the addition of other factors. The statute could be worded
to provide that the presence of these above-mentioned criteria establishes
a presumption of death for certain purposes, but would not be conclu-
sive. Such an approach would compel the doctor to make a specific finding
and to set forth definite criteria. In this way, reassurance would be
provided that the donor had indeed expired.
Despite the ominous implications that might accrue to the trans-
plant surgeon, there are certain protective measures that he can take
to lessen the chances of liability. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School set forth specific procedures that should be followed
in transplant operations: 1) the decision to declare the person dead,
and then to turn off the respirator, should be made by "the physician
in charge of the patient [donor] in consultation with one or more other
physicians directly involved in the case;" 2) the decision to declare the
donor dead should "be made by physicians not involved in any later
effort to transplant organs or tissue from the deceased individual;" and
3) "the patient [should] be declared dead before any effort is made to
take him off a respirator, if he is then on a respirator. Otherwise, the
physicians would be turning off the respirator on a person who is, under
the present strict, technical application of law, still alive." 1 5 By adhering
to these principles, the vulnerable surgeon will broaden the base of medi-
cal opinion and diminish the possibility of personal interest and influence,
thus providing greater legal protection. Thus, when the patient's brain
function indicates a flat electroencephalogram with his condition, as
determined by the attending physician, to be in a state of irreversible
deterioration and where bodily functions are maintained for a consider-
able period of time by supportive devices, such procedural safeguards
should be established to protect the patient and his family from being
exposed to the physical and emotional trauma of prolonged agony; to
protect the patient from a premature determination as to his death; and
to permit the availability of a possible transplant organ and, at the
same time, to protect the doctor. Furthermore, in all such situations it
is suggested that an ad hoc or permanent panel comprised of a neurol-
ogist or neurosurgeon and another physician be convened to indepen-
dently examine the patient and make a determination. The panel should
consult with the attending physician. Where a transplant is involved ,the members of the panel should not include any physician or. surgeon
involved in the care or treatment of a potential transplant recipient,
nor, where feasible, associated with any medical institution engaging in
transplants. The panel could be appointed by a judge or magistrate,
and it would report its findings to him. A summary hearing could be
held at any time and could even be convened at the hospital.
The provision in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which allows a
115. A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JA..A. 337, 339 (1968).
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donor to make an ante-mortem gift by a card in his wallet represents
an innovative advance. This provision could be combined with the pro-
posal for a "living will," which would permit an individual to indicate
by a card on his person that should he be confronted with a situation
of irreversible bodily deterioration or a state of incurability, he com-
petently authorizes and directs the attending physician to cease from
providing treatment that merely serves to unnecessarily prolong his life
or actually prolongs dying.116 The "living will" could contain a provision
that upon a final determination as to death and the cessation of treat-
ment, the bodily organs or the body may be used for transplants or
for the advancement of medical science. A panel, in determining the
time of death, might consider any specific desires of the patient as ex-
pressed in the "living will." In the absence of specific desires, discretion
would be the rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since heart transplantation has become a worldwide phenomenon,
the need exists for a treaty-statute to define death, to provide for the
donation of organs, and to facilitate the transportation of body tissue.
Human transplants, especially the heart transplants, reflect the
striving to participate in the eternal and the divine. Man is seeking to
conquer his mortality and to achieve immortality." 7 Transplants are
part of the technique for engineering the human divinity of physical
immortality. However, this quest has received the blessings of religious
leaders, such as Pope Paul, who indirectly indicated approval for heart
transplants." 8 Transplants represent a revolution in medical concepts
and, like the Copernican theories of astronomy and Einstein's Theory
of Relativity, presage profound changes in moral outlook and social
behavior. The law must accordingly adapt to these circumstances, pro-
viding guidance and sanctions.
The most pressing problem lies in defining death-the state in
which a human being must exist before he may be buried or before his
heart or other vital organs may be removed. Though the medical pro-
fession may formulate scientific criteria for the diagnosis of death, many
doctors are unsure of the criteria and require help from other disci-
plines. 1 9 The law can provide the standards of due process to protect
116. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 U. IND. L. J.
539-44 (1969).
117. See generally HARRINGTON, THE IMORTALIST, AN APPROACH TO THE ENGINEERING
OF MAN'S DESTINY, (Random House 1969).
118. Ellenbogen, Medical Miracles Need the Help of the Law, CONG. REc. E. 3670 at
E2671 (daily ed. April 3, 1968).
119. Corday, Life-Death in Human Transplant, 55 ABAJ 629 (1969); 205 J.A.M.A. 85
(1968); 1960 Wis. L. REv. 484, 497 (1968).
Death is an event where medicine, religion, and law meet around a human being
in his last minutes. Medicine has done its share as physical life has come to an end.
Religion claims the soul in the very moment it becomes separated from the body.
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both the donor and the doctor, and, at the same time, facilitate organ
transplants.
When somebody is dead, he is no longer "somebody." The responsibility for his
rights is taken over by law. At that moment, medicine has no more to offer and
respectfully steps aside, while religion continues to support the departed soul and
law perpetuates the abstract intentions of somebody, who is no more.
Dr. Lewis Weroke, head of the medical department of Sahlgrenska hospital and one
of Sweden's foremost heart surgeons, has announced a plan which could make heart trans-
plants out of date. His scheme is to remove a diseased heart from the patient, clean it of
diseased material, and then return it to the patient. A major difficulty with heart trans-
plants is getting the body to accept the "foreign" organ. Replacing the patient's own
heart is technically simple, and rejection problems are unlikely to be encountered.
Dr. Weroke described at a press conference how a heart, removed from the body of
a 35-year-old man who had died of a coronary thrombosis, was put into a physical
cleansing bath and was made functional again. However, it was too late to put it back
into the body because the patient was dead.
Based upon a disbelief in the practical value of heart transplants in the future, Dr.
Weroke finds his process to be the only alternative and, according to him, it is within the
limits of possibility to perform heart cleansing operations in the late 1970s "or at least in the
1980s." Weroke, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 7, 1969, at 6, col. 1.
